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pleadings are not essential, it being sufficient if the charges are
specific enough to inform him of the misconduct alleged. No
greater formality is required in the preliminary proceeding before the investigating committee." 4' 4
The section of the State Bar Association's articles of incorporation, authorizing the supreme court to strike an attorney's
name from the rolls and cancel his license to practice law on
proof of his conviction of a felony, does not require the court to
inflict such penalty.' So noted the supreme court in Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Steiner," stating that it might, within
its discretion, either suspend or disbar the attorney. 46 The fact
that the attorney repaid clients' money and the latter were willing to withdraw charges did not relieve the attorney from liability already incurred. The attorney had 4taken
fees without ren7
dering any professional services therefor.
Where the Secretary of the Bar Association notified defendant attorney thus: "I have been directed by the undersigned
Committee to notify you that an investigation will be had by it
of the alleged improper obtaining of divorces by you in various
cases in the Parish of St. Bernard," the supreme court held this
was not sufficient and specific notice. Section 3 of Article XIII,
of Articles of Incorporation of Louisiana State Bar Association,
requires reasonable notice and sufficient time and opportunity to
prepare."8
IV. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
HARRIET

S.

DAGGETT*

MINERAL RIGHTS

Servitude
Baker v. Wilder' evidenced yet another unsuccessful struggle
to prove interruption of a mineral servitude by acknowledgment
in a lease, allegedly joint, under the Mulhern case.2 Again the
44. In re Fallon, 204 La. 955, 16 So. (2d) 532 (1943).
45. 204 La. 1073, 16 So. (2d) 843 (1944).
46. See La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
47. In re Craven, 204 La. 426, 15 So. (2d) 861 (1943).
48. In re Armstrong, 205 La. 67, 16 So. (2d) 908 (1943). See Sections 3, 4,
and 5 of Article XIII of Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association.
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 204 La. 759, 16 So. (2d) 346 (1943).
2. Mulhern v. Hayne, 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
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court explained the Mulhern decision as an extension rather than
an interruption of the servitude:"We held that such interpretation of the ruling in the Mulhem case was erroneous, and reaffirmed the interpretation in
the Bremer case of the ruling in the Mulhern case, which was
that Mulhern, the owner of the land, by entering into a joint
lease with the owners of the servitude evidently intended to
extend the life of the servitude to the expiration date of the
lease in order that the lease might be effective."
The extension doctrine was not applicable here, as the lease
was not a true joint lease-i.e., "a contract entered into by the
parties, who joined together or acted unitedly for a common
purpose understood and agreed to by each and all of them."'
Three times the court observed that the parties were not together. It was not proved that those signing first knew who else was
to sign. The list of signatures was not written into the lease but
appeared on a separate sheet, attached by paste. One person
signed as witness eight times, clearly indicating that the parties
were not together when they signed or their attestant would
have signed but once. An additional paper labeled a "co-lessors
agreement," signed nearly seven months after the lease, was
offered. This precautionary instrument despite its rather strong
language was also unavailing, as the court said at best it was but
a bare acknowledgment of rights and interests of the parties and
did not show purpose or intent to interrupt prescription.
The court's consistent firmness of purpose in this intention
to iriterrupt doctrine has saved the landowner practically against
himself from indefinitely tying up his minerals through the
casual lease blocking process.often carried on by those who have
everything to gain and nothing to lose but time, conversation
and traveling expenses. This so called joint lease had been carried around from Louisiana to Texas and back again in the usual
fashion.
Plaintiff brought a concursus proceeding in Standard Oil
Company of Louisiana v. Futral5 under Section 7 of Act 123 of
1922,6 in order to determine the rightful owner to certain funds
representing the purchase price by the plaintiff of oil produced
by the lessees of a certain tract of land. The defendant Futral,
as landowner, maintained that all of the oil produced under the
3.
4.
5.
6.

204 La. 759, 767, 16 So. (2d) 346, 349.
204 La. 759, 769, 16 So. (2d) 346, 349.
204 La. 215, 15 So. (2d) 65 (1943).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1562.
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lease belonged to him as the interests which he had sold had
prescribed for non-user. Futral, landowner, had sold one-half of
his minerals to one group of persons designated in the opinion
as class "A" claimants and one-eighth to another group and the
claimants in the second line were designated as "B." It was clearly shown under the settled jurisprudence that both lines of title
to these outstanding servitudes had not prescribed, because the
prescription had been interrupted by user and suspended by the
minority of holders in the chains of the title. Futral alleged fraud
in the signing of a correction deed where an original 1/16 had
been changed to 1/2. He was unable to prove it. Futral then attempted to show that certain portions of the land from whence
oil was produced were not included in the description in the deed.
The court found that the sale had been one per aversionem under
Article 24957 and that the segment in question had been clearly
comprehended. The line in question read: "'Said tract being
measured off the extreme Southern end of Grantor's larger tract
of approximately Two Hundred (200) arpents.'-"
. The court stated that: "Since the 100-acre tract was taken
off the south end of Futral's large tract containing 266 2/3 arpents, it was necessarily bounded on the north by other lands of
the grantor, and the northern boundary line would necessarily
be a line running parallel to the southern boundary line of the
tract and located a sufficient distance north of the southern
boundary line to include 100 acres. Clearly, therefore, this is a
description per aversionem."9
An agreement to fix the boundary was said to have merely
clarified and not changed the description. The court stated that
Act 123 of 1922, the concursus proceeding act, made no provision
for the payment of costs, hence the court was free, under the
power vested in them by Section 2, Act 229 of 1910,10 "to tax the
costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against
any party to the suit, as in the judgment may be deemed equitable." The payment of costs was levied against the funds on deposit. On rehearing, it was argued that in the deed to the class
"B" claimants that only 1/8 royalty received by the vendor was
transferred and hence, a "royalty deed" and not a servitude was
in question. The court felt that under this particular clause there
might have been merit in that contention but that this clause,
7. La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. 204 La. 215, 226, 15 So. (2d) 65, 69.
9. 204 La. 215, 250, 15 So. (2d) 65, 77.
10. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1977.
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considered together with all other clauses, gave the construction
to it which. was considered in the first hearing.
Lease
Joint Lease. A second attempt to cancel a lease on certain
tracts non-contiguous to those upon which oil had been found
failed in Veeder v. Pan American Production Company. 1 The
lease instrument was interpreted and found to be a true joint
lease and hence, production on any part of the land included in
the grant held for all. Certainly the wording of the lease showed
clearly the intent of the parties to bind and the interpretations
of the court could scarcely have been otherwise. However, as a
matter of public policy, it seems unfortunate that under the leasing device, large tracts can be indefinitely tied up while under
the selling of mineral rights, creating servitudes, this can be prevented in cases like those under discussion. Many lessors may
not know the difference since the fundamental right to search
is the same.
The case of A. Veeder Company Incorporatedv. Pan
American Production Company,' 2 held that a lease made by several
lessors referring to themselves as the granter of a large acreage,
involving several non-contiguous tracts referred to as the land
was a joint lease and that production on any of the parcels would
hold the entire acreage described. The lease was most carefully
considered and statements heavily documented. The opinion is a
valuable treatise on joint lease.
Interpretation
On a writ of certiorari the supreme court annulled judgment
for plaintiff rendered by district and circuit court of appeals in
Oil Field Supply & Scrap Material Company v. Gifford Hill &
Company.' The matter was one of proof of a verbal lease with
option to buy certain pipe. If the option was for 30 days only as
found by the lower court, then plaintiff would finally receive
$2,603.95 for rent on the pipe worth $557.15 and, at the same time,
still be the owner of the pipe.
"The court of appeal noted that this was a harsh result
but justified its conclusion on the ground that the defendant
had bound itself to a severe agreement." 14
11.
12.
13.
14.

205
205
204
204

La.
La.
La.
La.

841,
599,
929,
929,

18 So. (2d)
17 So. (2d)
16 So. (2d)
934, 16 So.

314 (1944).
891 (1944).
483 (1943).
(2d) 488, 484.
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The supreme court granted the correctness of that statement
but said: "However, where the issue is as in the instant casewhat are the terms of the verbal agreement-the fact that informed and experienced persons do not usually and customarily
bind themselves to unjust and unreasonable obligations is a
serious factor that must be taken into consideration in determining that question."' 15
One interesting bit was a contention that "the trial court had
apparently decided the case in favor of the plaintiff by virtue of
numerical superiority of witnesses," a reminder of the "greater
number of swearers" doctrine!
State v. Texas Company, 6 is a proceeding to annul an amendment to an existing and valid mineral lease of 60,000 acres of
swamp and marsh land set aside for a State game preserve. The
amendment to this lease added some 125,000 acres of water bottoins which were allegedly intended to have been included in
the original lease, mentioned in advertisement required by law,
etc. The court found that the State Mineral Board has concurrent but not exclusive rights to bring suit on mineral questions
and after careful analysis of the statutes bearing on the specific
amendment in question, indicated that no valid amendment existed. After expression of these views, the exceptions were overruled and the case remanded. The following statement is of interest:
"Based upon what we have said above, therefore, our
opinion is that the state has alleged a cause of action and that
the case should be tried on its merits." 1
"Tending to support that opinion also, but not necessarily
serving as a basis for it, is an assertion in the brief of counsel
for the state that the attacked amendatory instrument extends
the original lease No. 214 'to include an additional approximately 125,000 acres of state water bottoms.' Of course, no
allegation to this effect is made in the petition; however, plaintiff is entitled to amend that pleading so as to make it.18

And if this amending be accomplished, certainly a cause of
action would be shown. The asserted appreciable excess (approximately 125,000 acres) over the approximately 60,000 acres
recited in the advertisement for the bids would furnish the
obvious and inescapable conviction that a leasing of the bottoms of the navigable waters was not intended."
15. 204 La. 929, 934, 16 So. (2d) 483, 484.
16. 205 La. 417, 17 So. (2d) 569 (1944).

17. 205 La. 417, 433, 17 So. (2d) 569, 574.
18. Bates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 La. 1029, 190 So. 120 (1939).
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Cancellation
Parten v. Webb19 is concerned with an effort on the part of
a landowner who had bought subject to an outstanding lease, to
have the original lease cancelled for failure to develop. The property was producing, having been drilled by a sub-lessee. The
evidence showed that the plaintiff had, by certain correspondence, urged the development of the tract and by his demand indicated that under his interpretation of the lease, it was still in
effect. He thus caused the original lessee to have the property
drilled by his sub-lessee and the court held that the plaintiff had
thus estopped himself from now changing his position of maintaining the lease in effect to the detriment of the original lessee.
The decision is well supported by the many cases on estoppel
analyzed and cited therein.
Privilege
The question in Sargent v. Freeman,0 "reduced to its simplest terms,... is whether, under Act 145 of 1934, John A. Sargent,
plaintiff, and the interveners asserting liens are entitled to a
lien and privilege on a drilling rig and equipment, the ownership
of which is claimed by John 0. Davis and his co-interveners."'
It was proved that labor on a generator, an essential part of
the equipment, was performed and materials were furnished.
Obviously Act 145 of 193422 granting the privilege did apply to
the drilling rig regardless of its ownership. The action being in
rem is constitutional like many long unquestioned liens for the
protection of various classes of creditors.
Partition
The case of Amerada PetroleumCorporationv. Murphy,2 3 was
a suit to cancel two leases on a 160 acre tract in Arcadia Parish.
The basis of the attack was that the leases were granted by some
of the co-heirs prior to institution of partition proceedings and
that the partition sale extinguished the lease. The defendant,
a non-resident, pleaded that he had not been made a party to
the partition proceedings and that the sale had not been made in
accordance with provisions of Act 336 of 1940, amending Article
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

205 La. 799, 18 So. (2d) 198 (1944).
204 La. 997, 16 So. (2d) 737 (1943).
204 La. 997, 1000, 16 So. (2d) 737, 738.
Dart's Stats. ,(1939) §§ 5101.1-5101.5.
204 La. 721, 16 So. (2d) 244 (1943).
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741 of the Code. Moreover, he pleaded that the law under which
the original partition suit was brought, Act 205 of 1938,24 was unconstitutional under Section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution
of the United States. The partition judgment in question was
rendered prior to the effective date of Act 336 of 1940 and all coowners of the land were made parties thereto. Defendant Murphy, the lessee, was not made a party to the partition proceedings while apparently under Act 336 of 1940 he does have this
right. The court decided that since it was evident from the language of the act that the legislature did not intend for it to have
any retrospective effect and since it was definitely a substantive
law and not merely a matter of procedure that the proceedings
under the old law and settled jurisprudence were valid. The
plea of the unconstitutionality of Act 205 of 1938 had no merit
as the partition proceedings were not instituted under this act
but under the express provision of Articles 1289-1414 of the Code.
The difficulties, if not impossibilities involved in the proceeding
according to Act 336 of 1940 have been pointed out before by the
writer in discussing Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Reese.
Perhaps some legislative change may make the matter smoother
before the court is faced with an occasion when the act must be
applied.
Unhappy partners again reached the supreme court in Sklar
v. Kahle, 5 when Dr. Kahle was successful in getting rid of a
receiver and Mr. Sklar forced to await judgment on dissolution
of the partnership for proper legal cause before partition of the
oil lease and other partnership assets could be secured.
Damages
The raising of oysters and production of oil in the same or related water beds caused the controversy in Doucet v. Texas
6
Company."
The suit was for damages for the value of oysters
allegedly killed by pollution of the water by the negligent discharge of various types of foreign substances into the water by
the oil producers. The lessees of the water bed for the production of oysters had obtained their lease from the state prior to
the granting of the oil lease but the state had reserved the right
in the oyster lease to lease for oil. That the lessee did have ownership of the oysters raised on this lease, was very clear from the
24. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4735.4.
25. 205 La. 31, 16 So. (2d) 896 (1944).
26. 205 La. 812, 17 So. (2d) 340 (1944).
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wording of the statutes and hence, that exception was easily disposed of. The law was clear but the facts were very troublesome
for the court, as the following excerpt from the opinion discloses:
"The record in this case is very voluminous, comprising 19
volumes and consisting of 4,577 pages, 3,533 of which are testimony and 862 of which contain exhibits. The case was filed
on October 13, 1933, and was argued here on October 7, 1943,
thus covering a period of some ten years. The trial was not
actually begun until some two years after the suit was filed,
or on October 1, 1935, and, after continuations from time to
time, was finally completed on March 28, 1939, the judgment
of the court being rendered on October 15, 1942, some two
and a half years thereafter. Counsel for plaintiff and defendant have elaborately briefed their respective views, discussing
exhaustively and in detail their versions of the case, no doubt
with the view of assisting the court, but notwithstanding this,
we find the opinions expressed in these briefs to be very conflicting, necessitating, on our part, a careful analysis of all of
the evidence in the case, particularly that of the experts. '' 27
Some experts seemed to feel that oil was helpful to the oyster,
while others thought that it was death to the oyster. The matter
of what effect an oil taste would have upon the commercial value
of the oyster was not discussed. Surely there could not be two
opinions about that. The court analyzed this mass of evidence
with infinite patience, decided that the oysters had been destroyed
by this pollution and awarded $10,650.00, with legal interest from
judicial demand and all costs against the oil company for their
negligent acts.
-SUCCESSIONS

Wills
Capacity. In Succession of Angers28 a mystic will was declared valid even though the testator was ill and taking drugs
at the time it was made. While he was "ill in body" the evidence
did not show him to have been mentally incompetent.
The case of Succession of Lanata29 has been previously noted
in this journal so need receive but little space here. Since the
testator had been interdicted on other grounds than insanity the
question might still be said to be unanswered as to whether an
interdict may make a will during a "lucid interval."
27. 205 La. 312, 317, 17 So. (2d) 340, 341.
28. 205 La. 190, 17 So. (2d) 247 (1944).
29. 205 La. 915, 18 So. (2d) 500 (1944),
REVWW 109.

noted in

(1944)

6 LOUiSIANA LAW
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Interpretation. In Succession of Simo,30 controversy arose on

the following provision in a mystic will: "'I give and bequeath to
Miss Edna Savoy, who is residing with me, all my rights, title
and interest in the succession of my late husband, Augustin B.
Rousseau, and all my rights, title and interest in the property
and assets appertaining to said succession inherited by me under
my husband's olographic last will and testament dated September 7th, 1923, and which was admitted to probate and ordered
executed by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.' ,,81
It was argued that the testatrix meant not only to give to
Miss Savoy community property left her by her husband, but
also her own half of the community. Applying the well known
principle that meaning must be given to every provision in the
will in order to carry out the testatrix' intention, the court decided that only part of the husband's share of the community left
to the widow was intended by her to pass to Miss Savoy.
Interpretation of a will and codicil was before the court in
Succession of Lacoume.32 Rules of interpretation were reviewed.
Equal distribution was favored and there was little doubt in the
wording of the testament but that the donor so intended. The
claimant, opposing the executor's distribution, placed a strained
interpretation on a certain clause in order to profit by accretion
from an alleged conjoint legacy.
Validity. In Succession of Lombardo," the court was occupied with a proceeding to have one will vacated and a later will
probated and executed. The proponents of the first will contended
that the second will was invalid for the following reasons:
"(a) That the will on its face fails to show that Richard A.
Dowling is a commissioned and qualified notary public in and
for the Parish of Orleans or the City of New Orleans, or that he
resides therein; (b) that the purported will fails to further state
that the witnesses named therein have obtained the age of sixteen years complete; (c) that the will was not entirely confected
without interruption; (d) that the date at the top of the will was
not written on the same date as the will was written; (e) that the
purported signature of Raymond Lombardo to the will is a forgery. '' 4 A supplemental answer was filed, "alleging that the will
should be declared null and void for the additional reasons, to
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

205
205
205
205
205

La.
La.
La.
La.
La.

592,
592,
511,
261,
261,

17 So. (2d)
595, 17 So.
17 So. (2d)
17 So. (2d)
263, 17 So.

889
(2d)
726
303
(2d)

(1944).
889, 890.
(1944).
(1944).
303.
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wit: (f) that Richard A. Dowling, the notary before whom the
will was made, was a nonresident and was without power or
capacity to act as a notary in the Parish of Orleans; (g) that it
does not appear from the recitations in the will that the subscribing witnesses are the same persons named in the body of the
will." 3 5
The court disposed of the matter of date by stating that
while' it might be better practice to embody the date within the
text of the will that the document would unquestionably stand
as a nuncupative under private signature whether certain of
these formalities had been rigidly enough followed to validate it
as a nuncupative by public act or not. The evidence was clear
that the notary was a resident of the Parish of Orleans and that
the signature was not a forgery. The handwriting expert was of
the opinion that the signature was forged, but opposing his testimony was that of the notary and the four subscribing witnesses.
The decision of the lower court that the second will was valid and
should be probated was affirmed.
Removal of Executor
The plaintiffs, as creditors, were seeking in Succession of
Lombardo36 to have a testamentary executrix dismissed on the
ground that she had failed to open a bank account, as executrix,
and to deposit succession funds and that she had converted certain money to her own use and that she had failed to file an account. The court found that since the claims of the creditors
were unliquidated and unacknowledged, that they should have
simply opposed her act. Furthermore, by virtue of the type of
claim they could not press it by rule, but must proceed with it in
the ordinary manner. Article 986 of the Code of Practice would
prevail over Articles 1150 and 1151 of the Civil Code if a different
interpretation was placed upon the articles of the Code. The
court had not ordered the executrix to deposit the money in the
bank in the name of executrix and to file an account. She fully
explained why she had temporarily and as a matter of convenience used succession funds and showed that she had immediately
replaced them and that they were intact. Her bank box had been
sealed in connection with these proceedings and hence she was
unable to render an account at the request of the plaintiffs until
35. 205 La. 261, 264, 17 So. (2d) 303, 304.
36. 204 La. 429, 15 So. (2d) 813 (1943).
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this ban was lifted. For all of these reasons the court set aside
the judgment of the district court removing the executrix.
Private Sale by Executor under Act 290 of 1938
An appeal from a judgment authorizing a testamentary executor to sell at private sale under the provisions of Act 290 of
193811 was the matter of concern in Succession of Pipitone.8 The
executor in his petition for authority to sell the property at private rather than public sale stated that it was advantageous to
the succession because he had received a written offer for the
property and that it would be necessary to sell the property
eventually anyway, in order to settle the estate and the proposed
private sale would cost the succession considerably less than
would a public sale. The opponents stated the succession did not
owe any debts of consequence and had $13,000.00 cash on hand
and that there were no unpaid legacies and, hence, there was no
necessity to sell the property either by public or private sale.
They argued that the only purpose for which succession property
could be sold under the provisions of Act 290 of 1938 was in order
to pay debts or legacies, and that if Act 290 of 1938 should be
given a broader interpretation it was unconstitutional because
the title to the act did not cover this new purpose. The court
found that Act 290 of 1938 did broaden the original powers of
executors and administrators and made provision "for any legitimate purpose that might arise, for disposing of the property,
besides the purpose of paying debts or legacies."3 9 Moreover, the
court stated: "This phrase 'for any other purpose' means, of
course, for any other lawful purpose, or reason of necessity. It
does not give to an executor or administrator carte blanche to
sell succession property for any purpose or reason that he may
deem sufficient, as the agent for the heirs or creditors or lega0
tees.

4

It was further argued that the executor's petition did not set
forth any real reason that might make it advantageous to the
succession to dispose of the property by either public or private
sale and the court agreed that the petition did seem deficient in
that respect. However, there had been a stipulation of facts on
which the matter was submitted to the judge which greatly am37.
38.
39.
40.

Dart's Stats. (1939) §§
204 La. 391, 15 So. (2d)
204 La. 391, 400, 15 So.
204 La. 391, 399, 15 So.

9706.4-9706.7.
801 (1943).
(2d) 801, 804.
(2d) 801, 803.
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plified the original petition. It appeared that one of the heirs of
the succession was an enemy alien, being a national of Italy, residing in that country. The Alien Property Custodian had been
duly notified by the executor and the enemy alien had cabled
her son, a resident of Mississippi, to represent her in the matter.
However, it was admitted to be impossible to get a power of
attorney from her under existing conditions. In order to give
the other heirs possession of their undivided interest in the succession property it would have been necessary to sue for a partition by licitation or make a public sale of the property. This
would have been much more expensive than the proposed sale
under the provisions of Act 290 of 1938. The executor was authorized to make the sale, retain the enemy alien's share and
proceeds in custody, subject to such disposition as he might be
obliged to make of the money under executive orders regarding
property of enemy aliens.
The court disposed of the plea of unconstitutionality by stating that the title did "fairly indicate" the subject matter, so that
no one dealing with the act could be deceived or misled and
hence, was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement "that the title shall be indicative of the object of the act."'
The following quotation regarding this much litigated subject
is helpful:
"That section does not require that every change which
an act of the Legislature may effect in other laws on the subject shall be expressed in detail in the title of the new act.
It requires merely that the title of the act shall be appropriate
to the subject dealt with in the act itself, and shall not be
misleading as to any purpose intended to be accomplished by
the act. That is emphasized by the fact that, in the Constitution of 1921, the clause 'and shall have a title indicative of such
object' was substituted for the clause 'and that [one object]
shall be expressed in its title,' which clause appeared in every
previous constitution from and after the adoption of the Constitution of 1845. See Const. 1845, art. 118; Const. 1852, art. 115;
114; Const. 1879, art. 29;
Const. 1864, art. 118; Const. 1868, 'art.
'
and Const. 1898 and 1913, art. 31. 42
The court has plainly shown that they intend
to uphold acts
which do not express every detail of the act in the title. In time
perhaps the legislature may come to have faith in this stand by
the court and do away with the practice which still continues in
41. 204 La. 391, 403, 15 So. (2d) 801, 805.
42. 204 La. 391, 402, 15 So. (2d) 801, 804,
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many instances of writing practically the whole act itself into
the title as was doubtless a good safety measure under the old
line of cases.
Another attack on constitutionality of Act 290 of 1938 was
that Section 19 of Article XIX of the Constitution had been disregarded because the act did not contain any provision to protect
a judgment creditor of a presumptive heir or a holder of a judicial mortgage against a presumptive heir. The argument was
that it would open the door to fraud on the part of the presumptive heir against whom a judicial mortgage had been recorded
and would promote collusion between such an heir and the executor and administrator of such a succession. The court saw no
merit in this contention as they stated that:
"The statute provides for publication of the proposed sale and
for a hearing, and for a judgment to be rendered contradictorily with all parties having an interest in the proposed sale.
The presumption is that the judge in such cases will decide
faithfully and refuse to approve a proposed private sale of
succession property if there is any element of fraud or imposition on the succession, or on the heirs or legatees or creditors
of the succession. Fraud or imposition is not made easier or
more likely by the act of 1938 than it was heretofore, when succession property could be sold only at public auction. The
fact that the statute does not declare that an executor or administrator shall obtain a mortgage certificate in the name of
each and every presumptive heir, before selling the succession
property under the provisions of the act, does not render the
act unconstitutional."
' '4
"The 'judgment is affirmed. 3
An application by the qualified testamentary executrix to
sell at private sale certain property of the succession was opposed
in the Succession of Gerber." The grounds of opposition were
that no list of debts was attached to the application; that the immovables could not be sold until after disposal of the movables;
that the name of the prospective purchaser and his agreement to
buy were not attached to the application; that there should be
not only the usual thirty day advertisement of the application,
but in addition, a separate ten days published notice.
The court stated that, if the furnishing of a list of debts was
necessary, such a list had been filed in the proceedings shortly
after the opposition. It was shown in the application that a sale
43. 204 La. 391, 404, 15 So. (2d) 801, 805.
44. 205 La. 279, 17 So. (24) 329 (1944),
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of the movables was not sufficient to pay succession debts and
hence, it was perfectly proper that immovables be sold before
the movable property was exhausted. There was no requirement
in Act 290 of 1938 that the prospective purchaser be named in
the application to sell. The statute as interpreted by the court
provides for only one notice by publication, namely, thirty days
for real estate, and provides that oppositions are to be filed
within ten days from the day when the last publication of the
notice appears.
Two other objections were made, namely; that the sale could
not be consummated without causing great disadvantage to the
minor's interest in adjoining lots and that the principle debt of
the succession was represented by a prescribed note. There was
no proof to sustain either of these objections.
Partition
Pryor v. Desha,4 5 was a suit to partition a 580 acre tract of
land. The defendants maintained that the property could be
partitioned in kind; and in answer to the partition suit it was
also maintained that the property owned in indivision was not
only the 580 acre tract, but all of the assets of their deceased
father because, they alleged, their mother during their minority
and acting as tutrix had illegally sold part of their inheritance.
The court recited the steps taken by the tutrix in connection
with the allegedly illegal sales made in 1913 under the old rules
of necessity for a family meeting, et cetera. The deeds in question did not recite that the sales were made to effect a division
or partition but on the face evidenced an outright sale for a stipulated money consideration. The court remarked that they had
remained on the records unattacked and unquestioned for approximately 28 years and that 22 years had elapsed since one of
the complaining heirs had reached his majority and 20 years
since the other had reached her majority. The court refused to
express an opinion as to whether the sales were valid or otherwise, or as to whether they might be attacked directly, but stated
that it was certain they could not be attacked collaterally in the
proceeding before the court and, hence, the only property to be
partitioned was the 580 acres about which the proceedings had
been instigated. The factual question of whether the property
could be conveniently divided in kind was then thoroughly ana45. 204 La. 575, 15 So. (2d) 891 (1943),
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lyzed. After a review of all the testimony, the court affirmed
the view of the lower court that the property could not be divided
in kind with proper reference to value and convenience and that
such division, furthermore, would result in a diminution of the
value of the entire property which is against the express rule of
Article 1340 of the Code.
The court held in Robin v. Lob, 4 that the absolute right to
partition granted by Article 128947 is necessarily postponed where

a succession owes debts, until the administrator settles the succession and turns it over to the heirs. This is true whether the
administrator is dealing with property owned outright or in indivision by the succession under his charge.
Seven children sued to partition certain property allegedly
held in indivision with their father in Lasseigne v. Lasseigne.41
They went through the proceeding of being put into possession
of their deceased mother's half of the community, together with
their dead sister's portion of the mother's estate before filing for
partition. Their major plea was that their mother's succession
had never been opened and hence their father's tutorship proceedings and the adjudication of their mother's one-half of the
community property to him were void. The court declared under
the clear provisions of the code that the mother's succession was
open by virtue of her death, that there had been no demand by
creditors for an administration, that the father had a right to the
tutorship of these plaintiffs (then all minors) and to have the
community interest adjudicated to him. Thus title in this property left the minors and theit right, if any, was for an accounting. They had been given their dead sister's share and more
when the property was adjudicated-a special mortgage had been
given, et cetera-so they had no rightful complaints on that
score.
Donations
An attempt to set aside a sale was made in Whitman v. Whitman,4 9 after discovery of oil near the ten acres in question which
raised it in value from about $150.00 to a speculative $2000.00.
The attack was that the transfer had been a donation of all the
donor's goods reprobated by Article 1497. The donation was
46. 204 La. 983, 16 So. (2d) 541 (1944).

47. La. Civil Code of 1870.
48. 205 La. 455, 17 So. (2d) 625 (1944).
49. 206 La. 1, 18 So. (2M?)633 (1944),
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proved to have been onerous and remunerative since the donee
pledged himself to support his mother for life and had supported
both father and mother previously for about two and a half
years. Furthermore, the court indicated that even without the
onerous and remunerative elements, this donation would not
have been stricken by the prohibition of 1497, as it was entirely
unproductive of income. Any breach of the support pledge had
been without fault on part of the son and merely because the
mother decided to visit around among all her children rather
than stay exclusively with the son. The onefous and remunerative donation was ruled by 1526 and clearly did not exceed
by one-half the value of the charges or services so was undisturbed. The point was urged that the son was already obligated
by law to support the mother. Obviously the other children were
also obligated and hence, the assuming of the solidary obligation
by one was a valid consideration.
Another attack was made on the ground that a material alteration had been made in the instrument. The following statement disposed of that contention.
"An alteration made in an instrument of conveyance for
the purpose only-and having the effect only-of correcting
an error so as to make the instrument express the true intention of the parties is not a 'material alteration' in the meaning
of the law which gives to a party to an instrument of conveyance a right of action to annul it if a material alteration is
made in it without his knowledge or consent."50
Settlement
The facts in the Succession of Farley5' were that a son of the
deceased had sold a piece of land to a Building and Loan Association and repurchased it, the title of the repurchase being in his
name and that of his mother. Other children of deceased now
claim that one-half the value of the repurchased land should fall
into deceased's community estate under the general presumption.
The mother, widow of deceased, was allowed to testify and other
evidence was admitted to prove that the mother permitted her
name to be used for convenience only; that she had paid no part
of the price and had no claim to the land of her son. Even had the
husband been living, she could have offered oral evidence to show
that her own separate funds had been used in order to rebut the
community presumption.
50. 206 La. 1, 14, 18 So. (2d) 633, 637.
51. 205 La. 972, 18 So. (2d) 586 (1944).
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A verbal agreement was the basis of claims in Succession of
De Loach, 52 and since more than eighteen months had elapsed
after the death of the person allegedly liable before suit was
filed, Act 207 of 1906 as amended by Act 11 of 192653 precluded
the admittance of parol evidence to prove the alleged contract.
A long factual resum6 of the various compromises-allocations of items of property, et cetera, appears in Bjorkgren v.
Bjorkgren54 wherein a suit predicated on fraud was unsuccessful
for its instigators as they were unable to sustain their burden
of proof. Incidently, the court reaffirms the logical conclusion of
a previous decision that an inventory may not be set aside when
the only complaint was in regard to a mere informality-in this
case-that the inventory was signed by but one witness.
Acceptance
Sanders de Hart v. Continental Land & Fur Company55 is a
continuation of the controversy over a valuable shell mound
located on Deer Island. In the petitory action, Continental Land
& Fur Company v. LaCoste,56 the plea of prescription of thirty
years was maintained against the fur company, which is sought
here to be held for damages for trespass and for value of clam
shells removed. The fur company's right emanated from one of
the heirs, successful in the petitory action but it was clear that
the property had always been held in common and it was hence
impossible for the one heir to acquire against the others. Furthermore, there had never been formal acceptance of the succession by any of the heirs and the tacit acceptance by the one in
possession was for all and not in preclusion of the others alleged
to have failed in timely acceptance under Article 1030, Tillery v.
Fuller.7 Conspiracy and bad faith were not proved against the
fur company nor were damages to the realty and the value of
shells in their natural state was the only liability of the defendant.
Attorney's Fee
A matter of attorney's fee was at issue in Succession of
Weil. 58 The testator had named his executor, but when he died,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

204 La. 805, 16 So. (2d) 361 (1943).
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2024-2025.
203 La. 1090, 14 So. (2d) 861 (1943).
205 La. 569, 17 So. (2d) 827 (1944).
192 La. 561, 188 So. 700 (1939).
190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938).
205 La. 214, 17 So. (2d) 255 (1944).
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the executor was in the service of the United States, and while
able to do part of the work, was obliged to appoint another lawyer as his attorney-in-fact. This attorney's claim was for $20,000.00 and was opposed by the residuary legatee, Touro Infirmary of New Orleans. The lower court awarded $15,000.00 and the
supreme court cut that to $10,000.00. They found that much of
the service rendered had been as attorney-in-fact and attorneyat-law for the executor, who should pay the plaintiff out of 'his
own fee of $10,000.00. A great many cases were examined and
much evidence analyzed in arriving at this settlement.
The court was guided by the following precepts well established by the jurisprudence:
"In fixing the fee of an attorney the court will consider and
weigh the testimony of other attorneys respecting the value
of the services rendered; but such evidence
is not necessarily
' 59
controlling or binding on the court.

"But applicable to all cases of this character is the rule, established by previous decisions of this court, that in estimating the value of the attorney's services consideration is to be
given to the responsibility incurred, the extent and character
of the labor performed, the importance of the questions presented, the amount involved, and the legal knowledge and
ability of counsel." 0
The claimant further desired 5% interest per annum from
the date of the filing of the final account, founding his claim on
Article 989 of the Code of Practice. The court decided that that
article contemplated recovery of interest from the date the debt
became due. Assuming, without deciding, that the attorney's
claim was a debt within the meaning of the article, the court
found that the claim had not yet matured because the estate was
still being administered, hence no interest was allowed.
FAMILY LAW

Custody of Children
Four cases dealing with custody6 ' appear in this resum6 of
the year's work of the supreme court. The one most interesting
general fact seems to be that the court now is concerned more
59. 205 La. 214, 221, 17 So. (2d) 255, 257.
60. 205 La. 214, 223, 17 So. (2d) 255, 258.
61. Wilson v. Wilson, 205 La. 196, 17 So. (2d) 249 (1944); Black v. Black,
205 La. 861, 18 So. (2d) 321 (1944); Matheny v. Matheny, 205 La. 869, 18 So.
(2d) 324 (1944); White v. Broussard, 206 La. 25, 18 So. (2d) 641 (1944).
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and more with working mothers. The mother who is working
either has no "need" or a materially reduced need and, hence,
the husband does not have to pay alimony for the support of the
wife. This is a great advantage to him and the new family which
he may found and surely is a credit to the divorced wife.
All of this being obviously true, the writer was concerned with
the attitude in two of the cases under consideration.

2

The judge

took the view that since the mother was working she would not
be able to give the child physical care and, hence, was influenced
to award the custody of the child to the father. If neither can
give the child physical care in a home, obviously a third party
has to be selected to do it. It would appear that the fact that the
mother is working should mitigate in her favor rather than
against her in such a situation, and that she would have the custody of the child, if otherwise entitled to it, of course, and could
select the person to whom the child was to be in part entrusted,
rather than having to surrender the child to relatives, friends or
other selectees of the divorced husband and thus lose the supervision of the child and for the most part the companionship and
direction of the child during her leisure hours. In this connection
it should be said that in one of the cases the court took the very
proper view that because the wife was supporting herself and,
indeed, making more than the divorced husband did not mean
that she would have to support, entirely, the children, but that
the father, whatever he was making, should contribute to their
support a proper sum.
8 was over the cusThe real contest in White v. Broussard,"
tody of a boy of nine years. The husband, a pullman porter, was
granted a divorce under Act 269 of 1916 as amended by Act
430 of 1938,4 after two years separation. After a thorough examination of the evidence, dealing with the character of the
mother and her capacity for caring for the child, the court overruled the judgment of the lower court on the custody matter and
awarded the child to the mother presently living in California.
Twenty-five dollars per month alimony was alloted as the husband admitted an average of $113.25 per month and the court
noted that he "omitted to include any of the tips that are cus'65
tomarily received by men in his profession!

62. Wilson v. Wilson, 205 La. 196, 17 So. (2d) 249 (1944); Matheny v.
Matheny, 205 La. 869, 18 So. (2d) 324 (1944).
63. 206 La. 25, 18 So. (2d) 641 (1944).
64. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2202.
65. White v. Broussard, 206 La. 25, 37, 18 So. (2d) 641, 645 (1944).
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The following excerpts from the opinion are strong expressions on the court's policy regarding custody of children of divorced parents:
"Our lawmakers long ago very sagaciously turned from
the antiquated theory of punishing the party cast in a divorce
proceeding to the far more important consideration of the
welfare of those children that are unfortunately and unhappily swept along in the turbulent wake of dissolved marriages....
"In applying this provision, the courts have consistently
held that the right of the mother to the custody of the child
is paramount to that of the father, unless, in his discretion,
the trial judge concludes it is for the greater advantage of
the child that it be entrusted to the care of the father, which
conclusion is, of course, siibject to review by us."66
Black v. Black 7 instances another case of dispute over custody of children, after divorce under the two year act. No attack was made upon character or capability of the mother, so
she was preferred, especially as the children were young girls.
She was head of an occupational therapy department at a government hospital in Charleston, South Carolina. In regard to alimony for the children's support, the following statement is of
interest:
"We see no reason why Mr. Black should not be required to
pay something toward the support of his children. It is the
duty of a father to contribute to the support of his child. Civil
Code art. 229. This duty rests upon the father during the
minority of the children and is not effected [sic] by divorce
or separation. The fact that Mrs. Black is earning more than
Mr. Black does not relieve Mr. Black of the obligation of contributing to the support of his children, although it may justify the award of a less amount than would be granted in case
Mrs. Black was in necessitous circumstances. The evidence
shows that Mr. Black is earning net about $112 a month. Under
the circumstances, we think Mr. Black, without suffering any
$30 a month toward the
undue hardship, could contribute
support of his minor children."68
The judgment of the district court was affirmed in Wilson v.
Wilson, 9 insofar as the defendant husband was ordered to pay
$100.00 per month to his divorced wife for her support and that
of her two minor children. The lower court's decision was re66.
67.
68.
69.

206
205
205
205

La.
La.
La.
La.

25, 27, 18 So. (2d) 641, 642.
861, 18 So. (2d) 321 (1944).
861, 867, 18 So. (2d) 321, 323.
196, 17 So. (2d) 249 (1944).
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versed in the matter of the custody of one of the children, who
had been placed in the care of Mr. Wilson's aunt. While the case
was on appeal, the aunt voluntarily returned the child to the
custody of her mother who had returned from a job in California
to Louisiana. The court stated the rule that they could not receive evidence originally or consider documents not introduced
in the lower court, but that the rule might be relaxed where
certain facts occurring during the pendency of the hearing in the
supreme court were not denied. Mr. Wilson urged that the alimony be reduced since his income had decreased and that of his
wife had increased, but the court stated that he must take this
matter up in the district court. In rendering the decision, the
trial court took into consideration the fact that the mother was
working and could not give constant attention to the child. Obviously the father is almost invariably working, and cannot give
constant attention to the child. Since this is the case, the writer
fails to understand why it should be a matter apparently mitigating against the mother's right to the custody of the child. Since,
under these circumstances, the child must be left with a third
person, the working mother should have just as much right to
name this person as the father.
Judgment for divorce was awarded in favor of the wife on
October 28, 1941. No demand for alimony was made and the custody of the child was awarded to the father on October 10, 1942.
In Matheny v. Matheny'7 0 the mother sued for $50.00 per month
alimony for herself and $50.00 per month for the child and asked
for custody of the little boy, of four years two months. The child
was actually in the custody of the father's parents, who had cared
for the child since he was eleven months old. In a previous attempt to gain the custody of the child, the mother had tried to
reach the district court by rule and had been referred to the
juvenile court, which continued the custody of the paternal
grandparents. Later, the juvenile court set aside the-order under
the authority of State v. McMillan,1 and then the present proceedings were instituted. The supreme court, while stating that
the maternal grandparent who had intervened should have custody, decided not to disturb the judgment in favor of the father
who kept the boy at the home of his parents. The cases giving
the mother preference in these situations were honored but the
mother here was in training for a nurse and really could not care
70. 205 La. 869, 18 So. (2d) 324 (1944).
71. 191 La. 317, 185 So. 269 (1938).
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for the child. Of course, she had shown that her mother was able
and willing to care for the child so the point seems poorly taken
when the child, though in legal custody of the father, was in
actual care of his parents. With the increased need for women to
work outside their home-particularly a divorced woman who
does not have a home except that perhaps, of her parents-custody will always go to the father under this analysis, and the
child, of course, will actually be not in the hands of the father
any more than of the mother, but in the hands of persons of his
choosing rather than of the mother's. It would seem that some
change of the law is needed to prevent the shuttling of litigants
between the juvenile and district courts in matters involving
children of divorced parents. The child's welfare is paramount.
If juvenile courts really perform the ffinction for which they
exist then presumably they are best equipped to deal with children. The interest of the child might be better served without regard to differences between the parents and their desires, sometimes underlaid by a motive of hurting each other. They have
already wrecked the child's best chance for a normal life by
breaking his home and certainly their continued bickering over
his person does not help.
Alimony
2
was for a reduction
The proceeding in Gerstner v. Stringer1
of alimony awarded under a divorce decree. The court found
that they were not justified under their discretionary power in
decreasing the amount from $50.00 per month to $30.00 per month
as prayed for by the plaintiff husband, neither did they see fit to
increase the award as asked for by the defendant wife. Plaintiff
husband was making $75.00 per week and was in ill health but
continuing to receive his salary. The wife was also in ill health
and had no means of occupation. She was acting as home keeper
for her sister and daughters, who contributed to the support of
the common home. It was true that the minor child had reached
the age of majority, but the court felt that under all the circumstances, there was no reason to disturb the award of $50.00
per month.
As has been said before, alimony is definitely a social problem and it is remarkable that the court with means at hand is
able to preserve a merciful balance. Economic and social changes

.72. 205 La. 791, 18 So. (2d) 195 (1944).
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have outmoded present laws and from a simple and rarely occurring situation the matter has assumed far reaching implications of a public nature with which the legislature should concern itself.
In the alimony contest of Slagle v. Slagle,18 the husband
pleaded his illness, unemployment and inability to pay the stipend. Some of these facts were controverted so the court ordered
a suspension of payment until the husband was physically fit.
The case was remanded that facts might be found as to whether
the husband was able to resume work without restriction on
rights of parties to introduce further evidence of the husband's
ability to pay during the time of his alleged illness and lack of
funds.
Jurisdictionin Divorce
The plaintiff in Zinko v. Zinko, 74 was seeking a divorce from

her husband on the ground of adultery. The parties were married
in Louisiana, had lived together in Louisiana, and the acts of
adultery were committed in Louisiana. All of this was admitted.
The husband, however, had been domiciled in Pennsylvania,
from whence he was taken into the army and his sojourn in
Louisiana had been while in service of the United States Army.
Despite the admissions that his intent had been to found his new
domicile in Louisiana, the trial court refused to take this as conclusive as to his change of domicile and, hence, refused -to take
jurisdiction without further evidence of the husband's intent to
change his domicile from Pennsylvania to Louisiana. The supreme court took the position that since personal service was
made upon the defendant husband and he had answered to the
merits of the cause, that they were not concerned with jurisdiction rationae personae, but were presented with the problem of
jurisdiction rationae materiae. The court decided that they could
take jurisdiction provided that the alleged cause arose in the
state and if the defendant had his principle domestic establishment in the state, or if the plaintiff wife had acquired a separate
domicile in the state after she decided to sue for divorce and had
changed her Pennsylvania domicile acquired with her husband
back to Louisiana. Since the record did not show the facts necessary upon which to base a conclusion, the case was remanded
73. 205 La. 694, 17 So. (2d) 923 (1944).
74. 204 La. 478, 15 So. (2d) 859 (1943).
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that evidence might be received on these points. Chief Justice
O'Niell was of the opinion that where no community property
was involved, the suit for divorce was purely a personal action
and, therefore, could be brought at the place where the defendant was residing, particularly when that was the place where
the offense was committed. Since the defendant had voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court as an individual,
the Chief Justice saw no need of the trial judge's decision on
want of jurisdiction.
The wife in Bruno v. Mauro5 excepted to the court's jurisdiction rationae personae and materiae in a suit for divorce filed
against her in Ascension Parish by her husband. It was shown
that the parties' last matrimonial domicile had been established
in East Baton Rouge Parish where the husband was still living
and hence the exception to the jurisdiction was sustained. The
fact that the husband had continued to vote in Ascension Parish
did not alter the situation, said the court, for the election lawsespecially provide that an elector may vote at the old domicile
until he has resided long enough at the new to entitle him to cast
his ballot. Obviously his political domicile was not decisive of
the issue in any case, but only an element of fact to be considered
in determining his civil domicile. The following well known rule
was recited by the court:
"Unless a husband abandon his wife or by reason of his
misconduct force her to acquire a separate domicile, 'a married
woman has no other domicile, and can acquire no other, than
that of her husband, and is bound to follow and live with him

wherever he may choose to reside.'

'76

OBLIGATIONS

Interpretationof Contracts
In Rock Island, A. & L. R. Company v. Gournay77 the question to be answered was whether a certain instrument had conveyed title or servitude. The act was labelled "Deed to Right of
Way." The court set forth the rules of guidance in these instances.
The intention of the parties must be ascertained from the entire
instrument. Nothing said must be disregarded. In general and
without evidence of contrary intent a "right-of-way" is under75. 205 La. 209, 17 So. (2d) 253 (1944).

76. 205 La. 209, 211, 17 So. (2d) 253, 254.
77. 205 La. 125, 17 So. (2d) 8 (1943).
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stood to be a servitude only. Applying these rules the court
found the following instrument italicized by the court to have
conveyed a servitude and not full ownership:
"'Deed to Right-of-Way
"'State of Louisiana
"'Parish of St. Landry.
"'I, Octave Ardoin a resident of the above Parish and
State, in consideration of the sum of Eighty no/100 Dollars,
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the further
consideration of the enhancement in value of my adjoining
lands by the construction of the railroad hereinafter mentioned, do hereby grant, convey, sell and deliver unto the
Rock Island, Arkansas and Louisiana Railroad Company, its
successors and assigns in perpetuity, a strip of land, one hundred (100) feet in width, over and upon the following described land situated in St. Landry Parish, State of Louisiana,
to-wit:
"'The North half of the Southwest Quarter of Section Thirty-seven (37), Township Three (3) South, Range One (1)
West, said right of way hereby conveyed containing 3.81
acres, said land being bounded on the North by E. F. Wesche
and on the South by John Bartis Guillory, said strip of land
being fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center of the
main track of said railroad as the same is now located on and
across said tract of land, with the right to change water
courses, and to take stone, gravel and timber and to borrow
earth, on said right of way for the construction and maintenance of said railroad;and if said railroad Company, its successors or assigns, shall deem it necessary to the proper construction of said railroad to make embankments, or cuts, or
other works that require a greater width than said right of
way, it shall have the right to make all such cuts, embankments, or other works on either or both sides of said right of
way, but not to exceed 50 feet in width on each side of said
right of way at any one point.
"'And in further considerationof the premises,we do hereby
acknowledge the receipt in full of all compensation and satisfaction for property taken, or to be taken, and damage done,
or to be done, by reason of the construction of said railroad.
"'It is understood that the said Company will pay for any
buildings that may be included in their said right of way. If
said Company should desire to enter aforesaid land before
crops are taken off, the Company is to pay for said crops.
"'This done and signed in the presence of two attesting
witnesses, the twenty-seventh day of July, 1906.' ,,T8
78. 205 La. 125, 131, 17 So. (2d) 8, 10.
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Having found that only a servitude was conveyed by the
instrument set forth above, the court was able to determine
the ownership of land and lease wherein all conveyor's holdings
had been included, necessarily comprising the strip in question
but subject to the railroads servitude of "right of way.' ' 79
In the course of the opinion in two cases80 wherein the main
issue was decided (Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Gournay)
namely, that a servitude only had been conveyed by the instrument in question, the court had made the following statement:
"On the contrary, if a right of passage, a right-of-way, or
a servitude only had been granted and conveyed to the railroad company by the deed, the railroad company would not
have had the right, as decided by the trial judge, to change
the water courses and to take the stone, gravel, timber and
earth on the 100 foot right-of-way and use it for the construction and maintenance of the railroad without paying additional compensation for the property taken or the damages
done."
Yet another opinion-Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Gournay, and Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Guillory 8 1-was necessary
to satisfy the litigants who complained of the recited statement.
Common law authorities were pleaded to the effect that a grant
of right-of-way to a railroad carried with it the special rights
granted by the instrument "and therefore the presence of the
clause in the deed granting the railroad company those rights
...is not in any way helpful in determining whether the parties
to the instrument intended a fee simple title or merely the grant
2
of a servitude.

8

The court pointed out that the servitude created was conventional; that certain accessory rights do accompany such a servitude under Articles 722, 772 and 77488 but that the determination

of these exact rights may well be controversial under the general
language of the Code articles and hence the parties in creating
a servitude would do well to put in the special clauses while, the
court reiterated, "if they intended to create a fee simple title in
the railroad company, the presence of those
stipulations in the
4
instrument were entirely unnecessary."'

79. Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Gournay, 205 La. 125, 137, 17 So. (2d)
8, 12 (1943).
80. Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Guillory, 205 La. 154, 17 So. (2d) 17
(1943); Ibid., 205 La. 164, 17 So. (2d) 21 (1944).
81. 205 La. 164, 17 So. (2d) 21 (1944).
82. 205 La. 164, 167, 17 So. (2d) 21.
83. La. Civil Code of 1870.
$4. 205 La. 164, 169, 17 So. (2d) 21, 22.
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The court was careful to express no opinion on the general
problem of whether an easement under the Common Law and
a servitude in the Civil Law are "legally identical in all respects."
With further observation to the effect that their first decision
did not depend upon this one bit of reasoning in any case, the
court adhered to their previous carefully prepared judgment.
The right to sunken logs was at issue in State ex rel. Den85
dinger, Incorporated v. Harris Lumber & Towing Corporation,
where certain individuals claiming ownership to the logs by a
deed of 1906, were attempting to enjoin a lumber and towing
company from salvaging these logs from the Tchefuncta River.
The court found that the wording of the original deed, plus all
circumstances surrounding the matter did not sufficiently prove
title to allow the restraining of the salvaging firm from removing
and converting the logs. Their permits from federal and state
governments so far as waterways were concerned seemed to be
in order.
Coverage of a compromise agreement was before the court
in Cassidy v. Joseph. 0 The wording of the agreement appears as
follows: "'Settle all claims between the First State Bank & J. H.
Cassidy, D. Rex Joseph, Simon M. Levy Estate. Of any nature or
kind whatsoever and dismiss all pending litigation.'"87
The court found that this verbiage covered any damages for
libel in connection with the controversy as well as indebtedness
involved.
Suit was brought on a verbal contract to sell ballast in Murtishaw v. Glassell-Taylor.8 The parties differed as to whether
the price to be paid for the ballast was $1.70 per cubic yard on
the basis of 2700 pounds or $1.70 per cubic yard. Defendants were
willing to pay on a basis of 3000 pounds per cubic yard. It appeared that some of the parties had measured the yardage and
the defendants themselves significantly kept no record of yardage
and had evidently relied on weight. The court felt that the district judge was in a better position to evaluate testimony given
on trial and found no reason to disturb the judgment for plaintiff.
A real estate agent sued in Harvey v. Riedlinger8 9 for his
commission under the following contract:
85. 204 La. 508, 15 So. (2d) 869 (1943).
86. 204 La. 664, 16 So. (2d) 225 (1943).
87. 204 La. 664, 666, 16 So. (2d) 225.
88. 205 La. 794, 18 So. (2d) 196 (1944).
89. 17 So. (2d) 60 (La. App. 1944).
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"'This Authorization to be binding at all times unless
revoked by one hundred and eighty days written notice by
registered mail. If this property is sold within 180 days after
termination of this Contract to any person or persons to whom
S. A. Harvey may have submitted the property directly or
indirectly, while this contract was in force, the commission
shall be paid S. A. Harvey no mattqr by whom said sale is
made.' 9o

Notice was given but contract to sell to a third party without
help from the realtor was entered into within the 180 day period,
though the sale was not consummated until after that time.
Plaintiff was awarded his commission with interest, costs and
attorney fees. The contract to sell contained the clause "balance
subject to homestead terms" and it was also pleaded that the
commission to the realtor was not due because of this "potestative condition." The court stated that the law was well settled
that such a condition was not potestative but merely suspensive
and furthermore, that even had the condition been potestative
the defendant "should not be permitted to attempt to avoid liability to one agent by showing that a contract which he made
through another, though effective and though acted upon, could
not have been enforced had the other party to it attempted to
recede from it."' 1
The concern of the court in Succession -of Bisse,92 is purely
one of interpretation of a contract classified as "commutative"
under Article 1768, the sole citation of the opinion. Discussion
would be meaningless without a setting forth of the long instrument, found in the opinion, to which the reader is referred.
Security
In S. P. Weaver Lumber & Supply Company v. Price,98 plaintiffs, guarantors of a building contract sued to recover from the
property owners $4,632.01 for certain materials and extras. The
contractor had abandoned the job and defendants had to employ
their own builder to complete the plans. Extra expense was
caused by the faulty construction by the first contractor. The
owners tendered the difference between their contract price and
their cost which the guarantors refused to accept. This sum was
made the amount of the judgment as the court found the owners
90.
91.
92.
93.

17 So. (2d) 60, 61.
Ibid.
204 La. 861, 16 So. (2d) 460 (1943).
205 La. 678, 17 So., (24) 917 (1944).
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to be entitled to a building constructed according to specifications
whether the contractor and guarantor lost money on the deal or
not.
By yirtue of certain manipulations the defendant in Pease v.
Gatti" had managed to benefit himself to the amount of a $3,000.00 promissory note at the time of foreclosure of a second
mortgage note of $700.00 given to a homestead association, of
which the defendant was secretary-treasurer. The widow and
heirs of the original mortgagor were successful in proving the
manipulations and were awarded a judgment by the lower court
which included the value of the note at the time received less
certain expenses. The supreme court affirmed this judgment.
The main discussion dealt with the matter of the value of the
note. The court stated that there were ordinarily two elements
of consideration in determining the worth of first mortgage
paper: "l-The financial responsibility of the maker and of the
endorsers, if any, thereof; and 2-the value of the property mortgaged to secure the payment of the note."95
Since the court had no evidence regarding the first element
they concerned themselves with the second and after weighing
the testimony of the "experts" and giving due consideration to
the circumstances they were satisfied with the $2500.00 set by the
trial court. The matter of the date at which interest began to
run was also at issue. It was contended by the appellant that
the lower court should have only allowed interest from judicial
demand, or from the date of the judgment rendered on the accounting, instead of from the date upon which the appellant had
received the note. The theory was that the debt was unliquidated
at the time the note was received and retained. The court
pointed out the amendments to the Code and Code of Practice
(Articles 1938 and 554, respectively), and sustained the lower
court in awarding interest from the date upon which the appellant had wrongfully received the note. Act 206 of 191616 was said
to apply only to "judgments, sounding in damages 'ex delicto'."
Quasi-Contract
Elam v. Shushan,7 is a most interesting case highly flavored
with examples of the force of the understatement, an art of
94.
95.
96.
97.

205 La. 949, 18 So. (2d) 511 (1944).
205 La. 949, 952, 18 So. (2d) 511, 512.
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1734.1.
205 La. 471, 17 So. (2d) 713 (1944).
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which the Chief Justice is a master. The suit was in quasi-contract for $4,000.00 worth of services by a civil engineer for planning and supervising various elaborate constructions on defendant's palatial estate in St. Tammany Parish. Even without reference to the defendant's testimony, proof was adduced, oral and
written, to show that plaintiff's services were a gift for which he
could not now claim recompense. The following excerpt is a fine
expression of the balanced legal principles involved in the controversy:
"In the words of Justice Slidell, in Camfrancq v. Pilie ...
"'It is true, as urged by the defendants, that gratitude for
benefits received, or the hope of future favors, is a sufficient
foundation for a contract; and that gratuitous contracts are
expressly recognized in our law. But it must be remembered,
on the other hand, that, according to the elevated morality of
the civil law, no one ought to enrich himself at the expense
of another; and that, where a party calls upon another to do
a thing, the law, in the absence of contrary proof, supposes an
obligation to pay for what is done. For actions without words,
either written or spoken, are presumptive evidence of a contract, when they are done under circumstances that naturally
imply a consent to such contract.',,
SALES
The plaintiff sued to resolve a sale for nonpayment of the
purchase price of land in Louis Werner Saw Mill Company v.
White29 The district court decided for the plaintiff. The court of
appeal decided against him and on a writ of certiorari to review
the judgment of the court of appeal, the supreme court as did
the district court decided that the sale should be resolved. The
facts were that plaintiff, the original vendor, had sold to the defendant the land in question, taking $400.00 down and a mortgage
and vendor's privilege to secure the note for the remaining
$400.00 which was to be paid a year after the sale. More than ten
years after the sale the original vendee sold the property to his
daughter. The sole legal question was whether or not a resolutory condition-nonpayment of the price or part thereof-can be
enforced ten years after the recordation of the mortgage, but
within ten years of the maturity date of the mortgage note when
the property has been sold to another person more than ten years
after the recordation of the mortgage, but within ten years of the
98. 205 La. 471, 473, 17 So. (2d) 713.
99. 205 La. 242, 17 So. (2d) 264 (1944).
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maturity date of the note. The court of appeal had taken full
cognizance of the law on resolution of sales as it had originally
stood. That law was that the right to dissolve for nonpayment of
the purchase price is a substantive remedy entirely independent
of the existence of a mortgage or privilege. It was entirely clear
that the purpose of the vendor was to regain the property free
of encumbrances and, of course, he must restore to the vendee
any part of the price which had already been paid, in order to
resolve the sale for the nonpayment of any residue. This remedy is entirely different from the situation when the vendor
wishes to enforce the sale and execute upon his security for
the remainder of the price. However, the court of appeal had
grounded its conclusion that this vendor could not resolve the
sale upon their interpretation of the amendment to Article 2561
by Act 108 of 1924. As amended and re-enacted, the article reads
as follows: "If the buyer does not pay the price, the seller may
sue for the dissolution of the sale. This right of dissolution shall
shall be an accessory of the credit representing the price, and
if it be held by more than one person all must join in the demand for dissolution, but if any refuse, the others by paying the
the amount due the parties who refuse shall become subrogated
to their rights."
The court of appeal in interpreting the words "accessory of
the credit representing the price" thought that the effect of the
amendment was to give to the life of the right to resolve the
same length as the life of a mortgage, which when accessory to
an obligation stands or falls by the life of the obligation. The
supreme court in reviewing this decision by the court of appeal,
stated their entire disagreement with this view. The supreme
court felt that the legislature did not intend to change the prescriptive period applicable to actions to enforce resolutory conditions. That period had always been understood to be ten years
under Article 3544 dealing with all personal actions not otherwise provided for. This prescriptive period had been understood
to begin to run from the date when the debt or the unpaid portion thereof became due. The supreme court's explanation of the
reasons for their interpretation of the amendment are most interesting and convincing. It was explained that under the jurisprudence preceding the amendment of 1924 the right to dissolve
for nonpayment of the price was personal to the vendor and did
not pass with the transfer of notes representing any credit portion of the price unless there had been a special subrogation by
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the original vendor. The rule was that all parties who had an
interest in the credit portion of the price had to join as parties
plaintiff and if they would not join there was no provision which
compelled them to do so, and the action to resolve would fall.
Thus, it was almost impossible in some situations to exercise the
right to resolve the sale, hence, said the supreme court, the purpose of the amendment in speaking of the right to resolve as "an
accessory of the credit representing the price" meant that the
right would pass into any hand, or hands, into which the credit
might pass. Furthermore, the amendment provided that if some
of those who had a right in the credit refused to join in the action
to resolve the sale, the others, by paying their portions, could
become subrogated to their rights. So far as the prescriptive
period applicable to the action was concerned, the court said
that no change had been made and if, indeed, the legislature had
intended to change the prescriptive period they could not have
done so by merely amending Article 2561 which was entirely unrelated to Article 3544, without even mentioning the latter article. This full and clear explanation was badly needed as certainly the judge of the court of appeal was not the only one who
had placed a different interpretation upon the amendment and
many were in doubt about what the amendment of Article 2561
really accomplished.
Nothing new appears in Weingart v. Deiagdo,10 wherein a
vendor, doubtless because of a rising market vainly attempted
to avoid a contract to sell. The potestative condition was pleaded
but the condition was good as it was grounded on the rather
usual contingent clause of approval of loan from homestead or
other finance corporation. The plea that the loan had not been
secured within the term specified failed in proof as did the plea
that the realtor was not an agent for the vendor.
In Bologna Brothers v. Stephens, 10 1 plaintiff's complaint was
founded on the principle that the sale price must be returned if
the thing sold was not owned by the vendor. The vendee had not
been disturbed in his possession; the second vendee, allegedly of
the same property, had not been made party so the court remanded in order that the latter might be done and the matter of
whether or not he had a "perfect title" to the disputed portion
established.
100. 204 La. 752, 16 So. (2d) 254 (1943).
101. 206 La. 112, 18 So. (2d) 914 (1944).
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The court indicated that if the claimant did have such a title.
that would be sufficient basis for restitution of price to the plaintiff. This doctrine appears established by a line of decisions.
LEASE
02
The case of Fajoni v. Frierson'
held that the lessee plaintiff
could not cancel his lease with the defendant because the town
had revoked his, the lessee's, permit for selling liquor and hence
rendered the leased premises useless to him for the purpose
leased, namely, to operate a bar for colored people. The plaintiff
relied upon Articles 2692 and 2695 dealing with the duty of the
lessor to maintain the premises so as to serve the purpose of the
lease and to guarantee the lessee against vices and defects. Article 2699, allowing annulment when the premises cease to be fit
for the purposes of the lease, without fault of the lessee, was also
pleaded. The court stated that the revocation of the permit was
due to the lessee's fault-a matter between him and the town'and had no bearing on the lease contract.
The case of Zibilich v. Rouseo'08 was distinguished as in that
case it was the lessor's duty to put in the proper safeguards
against fire to meet the necessities for use as a theatre. "The
picture show was not closed because of the manner in which thelessee operated it."
On certiorari, the supreme court in Bates v. Blitz,'"' affirmed
the judgment of the court of appeal, granting $1,580.50 against a
lessor for damage sustained by a tenant when a small platform
collapsed. The case turned on whether the platform was there
when the tenant took possession and was known to the lessor, or
his agent. Had it been otherwise, the doctrine of the latter case,
Fischer v. Wells Fargo & Company Express,"5 would have applied and the lessor held not liable.
Wooten v. Jones'06 started as a proceeding to eject a lessee.
Parol evidence was not admitted by the lower court to show
fraud in an authentic act of sale and hence the supreme court
remanded the case. On the merits the trial judge found no fraud
or misrepresentation in connection with the act of sale and the
supreme court, after a lengthy and careful review found no reason to disturb the judgment of the lower court.

102. 17 So. (2d) 43 (La. App. 1944).
103. 166 La. 547, 117 So. 586 (1928).
104. 205 La. 536, 17 So. (2d) 816 (1944).

105. 205 La. 956, 18 So. (2d) 581 (1944).
106. 200 La. 333, 8 So. (2d) 46 (1942).
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PROPERTY
Expropriation
An appeal was taken from the award of a jury of freeholders
in expropriation proceeding in Louisiana Highway Commission
v. Paciera.1° The owner asked for $40,000.00. The freeholders'
jury had awarded $4342.00 for the land to be actually taken and
$7171.00 for damages to other property of the owner occasioned
by the taking. The court stated that while the freeholders' award
was always treated with respect, it was none the less the duty of
the court to reduce what they considered an excessive award.
Their final judgment was $3500.00 for the property taken and
$3500.00 for damages to defendant's remaining property. The rule
was stated as follows:
"The amount due for private property expropriated for
public purposes is its market value when taken and compensation for any damage that might be caused to remaining
property. The market value is what a willing purchaser
would pay a willing seller under ordinary and usual circumstances."10 8
The reduction was a result of conflicting testimony regarding
values and the fact that most of the high estimates were based
on anticipated rental values.
Again, a property owner appealed in Louisiana Highway
Commission v. Israel °9 from a judgment for $4,500.00 given for
property expropriated for highway purposes. The main difficulty
was in regard to consequential damages to the remainder of the
plot, since a segment was left with no depth at all which then
widened at an angle of 45 degrees, so that more than 50% of the
frontage had no usable depth, and no part had a regular depth.
Thus, the location was no longer desirable or valuable as a site
for an oil station, et cetera. After careful review of the evidence,
however, the court was satisfied that "no manifest error" had
been committed by the jury in the award of $4,500.00 and the
judgment was affirmed.
In State v. Dowling 10° another expropriation suit, the court
found but one witness, an employee of the highway department
seeking to obtain the property, who placed a lower value upon
the property than that upon which the jury of freeholders had
107.
108.
109.
110.

205
205
205
205

La. 784, 18 So.
La. 784, 789, 18
La. 669, 17 So.
La. 1061, 18 So.

(2d) 193
So. (2d)
(2d) 914
(2d) 616

(1944).
193, 194.
(1944).
(1944).
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based their award. Indeed, most of the witnesses placed a much
higher value upon the property than had the jury. The award
was found not to have been "manifestly excessive" and, hence,
was not disturbed.
The syllabus of the opinion in Glover v. Town of Ponchatoula"' seems adequate: "Where state highway department had
taken over the improvement of a town street as part of the highway system and constructed a concrete slab and shoulders thereon, and highway commission had primary responsibility for
maintenance thereof, and the town had no authority to maintain
or change the shoulders, the town was not liable for injuries
allegedly caused by defect in shoulder."1
The court was concerned with interpretation of Acts 95 of
1921118. and 328 of 19261" in placing responsibility for the defective condition of the street.
Dedication
In Goree v. Midstates Oil Corporation," 5 the court held that

Act 220 of 1914116 declaring that roads worked for three years by
police juries are "public roads" does not show a legislative intent
to set aside "the ancient law, which is that 'the soil of the public
roads belongs to the owner of the land on which they are
made.' ,11 The tacit dedication theory of this act must be distinguished from the "statutory dedication" theory announced in
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company v. Parker Oil Company,1 8
where a land company following Act 134 of 1896 "formally and
intentionally dedicated, streets shown on map filed" and hence
was declared to have divested itself of the fee as completely as
if it had made a sale of the said streets and alleys to the public.
Homestead
One Louis Provost having become heavily indebted to a
wholesale meat dealer, gave the latter a mortgage on his residence and land, the homestead rights having been duly waived
by him and his wife. The mortgage note was transferred for in111. i7 'So. (2d)'44 (La. App. 1044).
112.
113.
114.
115.
118.
117.
118.

Ibid.
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3555.
Dart's Crim. Stats. (1941) § 1291.
205 La. 988, 18 So. (2d) 591 (1944).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3634.
205 La. 988, 1006, 18 So. (2d) 591, 597.
190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
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debtedness and when due, Provost transferred the property to
the holder and proceeded to lease the property. Now, in Provost
v. Harrison,119 plaintiff seeks to regain the land and dwelling. No
fraud was proved. The main contention by Provost was that the
waiver of the homestead was unconstitutional. The argument
was "that in view of the constitutional provisions, a mortgage
bearing upon property occupied as a home cannot be given for
the purpose of converting an unsecured debt into a debt secured
by mortgage on property otherwise entitled to the homestead
exemption. From the wording of section 2 of Article 11, plaintiffs
draw the conclusion that the waiver of the homestead right accorded by section 3 of ° Article 11 applies only to the debts enum'
erated in section 2. 12
The court stated that Section 3 of Article 11 provides for
waiver of debts that are exempt-Section 2 listing debts that are
not exempt and for which no waiver is necessary. A mortgage
given to secure a pre-existing debt is valid. Provost voluntarily
deeded his property in any case and no merit in any of his contentions existed. While it was definite that the transfer was completed on Monday, the court none the less made the following
observation which is well to record in answer to the recurring
argument on non-legality of Sunday dealings: "we know of no
law in this state and have been referred to none which prohibits
the making of contracts, the signing of notes, or the execution
'' 2
of sales or other transfers of property on Sunday. 1 1
Tax Titles
The action in Third District Land Company, Limited v. Las.
sere 2 2 was one seeking confirmation of a tax title. The main
defenses made by the principal defendant Milne were two-one
that the adjudication to the indicated person assessed was a nullity since there was no written authorization for the holding
of the auction which was alleged to have passed title. The other
defense was that the taxes had been paid. Both of these pleas
were sustained. The court cited authority for the principle, requiring written instructions to the auctioneer to sell, conditions
of the sale, et cetera. This provision falls under the general principle that title to real estate cannot be created by parole evi119. 205 La. 21, 16 So. (2d) 892 (1944).
120. 205 La. 21, 26, 16 So. (2d) 892, 894.

121. 205 La. 21, 30, 16 So. (2d) 892, 895.
122. 204 La. 451, 15 So. (2d) 850 (1943).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. vI

dence. The burden was on the plaintiffs to show that written
authorization for the holding of the auction had been given and
they failed in their proof.
The court citing copious authority stated that it was the
settled jurisprudence that a tax sale of property upon which the
taxes had previously been paid was a nullity. The Milne Asylum
showed that there had been a double assessment through an error
made by the assessor in 1923, the first time that the eleven lots
in question had been assessed to the individual from whom plaintiff allegedly had his tax title. The proof was clear and convincing and the Milre Asylum was at all times in good faith and
without knowledge of the assessor's error, as they had paid their
taxes under the same general description given for many years.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the tax title was
a nullity. One lot in the square to which the Milne Asylum laid
no claim had been sold and the taxes upon it had not been paid
by the owner. The plaintiff established his tax title as to the one
lot.
A suit in the nature of concursus appears under title of Board
of Commissioners for Atchafalaya Basin Levee District v. Sperling,128 wherein the plaintiffs were seeking to pay actual owners
of property appropriated for levee construction. A tax title was
in question. The title was invalid since there has been no service
of delinquency. The five year prescriptive period for attack had
run, however, so the only real question was one of fact to determine whether there had been actual corporeal possession "sufficient to operate as a continuing protest against the tax title and
thereby prevent the peremption from accruing." Proof on this
point was in favor of the holder of the tax title.
Suit for specific performance of contract to buy in Yuges
Realty v. Jefferson Parish Developers, Incorporated'2" was defended on the ground that title was defective. Plaintiff, seller,
founded his title on certain tax sales, which were said to have
been invalid. The invalidity alleged was that at the time of sale
the property was assessed to one other than the owner and under
a "radically defective" description. Forfeitures had taken place
nearly sixty years before these pleadings and the court held irregularities to hAve been cured by the prescription of five years
under Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution of 1921, and by
Act 147 of 1932.
123. 205 La. 494, 17 So. (2d) 720 (1944).
124. 205 La. 1033, 18 So. (2d) 607 (1944).
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The following excerpts give the guiding principles of the decision:
"This court has repeatedly held that, for the purpose of
prescription under the Constitution, it is immaterial whether
the assessment was made in the name of the true owner, or
in the name of another, or in no name at all.... The settled
rule in this state and elsewhere is that 'a tax sale which describes no property, or which contains a description so vague,
indefinite, and uncertain that the property intended to be sold
cannot be identified, is no sale at all, and the peremptive periods specified in the Constitution do not apply.'... But the
rule is equally as well settled that, where the description of
the property in an assessment or tax sale, although imperfect,
is reasonably sufficient to identify the property, or furnishes
the means for identification, the limitation or prescriptive
provision in the Constitution, designed to protect tax sales,,
cures all
irregularities and nullities in the assessments and
125
sales."
Community Property.
Plaintiffs' claim in Wooley v. Louisiana Central Lumber
Company"' was based on two points, both of which were clearly
against them. Their father had applied for a homestead entry,
died before final proof and the patent was issued to his widow.
Under the once uneasy but now settled jurisprudence, the property thus became the separate property of the widow, vesting
after dissolution of the community under which the plaintiff
claimed. The widow later sold the land in question, and plaintiffs
now claim long after her death that she was insane at the time.
She had never been interdicted nor had interdiction ever been
applied for. The act itself manifested no lack of reason on its
face. The thirty day period of 1788 had many times elapsed.
Plaintiffs' claim obviously failed.
In Maggio v. Papa,1 7 the heirs of a deceased spouse sued
the survivor for their share of the proceeds of a sale of community property and for an accounting of their interests in their.
mother's half of the community and that of their sister who died
without issue after their mother's death. The father had remarried and thus terminated his legal usufruct of his first wife's
share of the community property. The case is concerned with.
fact finding and accounting involving credit for debts of the
125. 205 La. 1033, 1041, 18 So. (2d) 607, 609.
126. 204 La. 801, 16 So. (2d) 360 (1943).
127. 206 La. 38, 18 So. (2d) 645 (1944).
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community paid by the father, et cetera. Since the suit was for
an accounting, the three prescriptions for rents collected, after
the usufruct expired did not apply. The lower court had permitted funeral expenses of the wife to be deducted from the community rather than from the share of the deceased and this item
was corrected. The father's share of his daughter's one-third
part of her mother's one-half was one-fourth which gave him an
interest in the whole of 13/24 while the two surviving daughters
were entitled to an 11/24 interest after proper credits were allowed the father, including expenses of the children charged
against their own estates.
In Jones v. Deese,1 28 the presumption that land bought during community regardless of which spouse takes title was rebutted to the satisfaction of the court. The property bought sixty
years before was declared the separate property of the wife. She
and her daughter testified and were believed with no corroboration but the fact that the wife's father was financially able to
make her the money gift for the land purchase, as she said was
the case.
In Russo v. Russo," the question in the words of the court
was "whether or not a wife, who obtained a separation from bed
and board and thereafter entered into commutative contracts with
her husband in settlement of the community property and her
rights to alimony, may plead their nullity without first offering
to return the consideration received therefor."' 10 After honoring
the general rule that tender is required, the court pointed out
that Article 1793 makes an exception in the case of incapacitated
persons. However, since these spouses were judicially separated,
their contract regarding the settlement of community was especially allowed by Article 2446. As to the alimony agreement,
the wife did not have to tender the consideration given before
attacking the contract because of incapacity, but in case of invalidation she would then have to return any amount that appeared to have been applied "to the necessary use or benefit of
the incapacitated wife.", The judgment below was annulled and
the case was remanded.
Upon statement of facts made, a legal question was certified
to the supreme court in McHenry v. American Employers' Insurance Company.18' The wife by negligent operation of an automo128.
129.
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bile seriously injured her husband. The wife was employed and
was about the business of her employer when the accident occurred. The wife and her employer were covered by an automobile liability insurance policy issued by defendant. Payment
of the insurance was resisted on the ground that since the judgment would be community property, the wife would be profiting
by her own negligent act. The court found that the community
and hence the wife would only be reimbursed-not profited, by
recovery and hence the theory of defendant would not apply.
Aside from actual expenses incurred the husband was awarded
$500.00 for mental and physical shock, $3,500.00 for 75% permanent disability, $800.00 for pain and suffering. These three items
were said to be reimbursement to the community for impaired
earning capacity of the husband. The decision is eminently satisfactory in that it prevents an insurance company from escaping
just liability-the purpose of the contracts-on a technicality
arising .under the law of husband and wife. In substituting the
word reimbursement for the word profit under the theory advanced by defendant for denying recovery to the wrongdoer, the
opinion but discloses again the need for legislative adjustment
of some of our community property acts. In differentiating cases
from other community property jurisdictions where the theory
of the defendant prevailed, the court pointed out that those cases
dealt with negligence by the husband, causing injury to the wife,
where judgment would have been community property and that
"ordinarily the wife contributes but little in a financial way to
the support of the community." Judging from the figures given,
even before the war, as to the number of married women gainfully employed without their homes-this statement is a very
doubtful one. Furthermore, if the very sound doctrine that "it is
not what is made but what has to be spent" were applied to
wives even when occupied solely within the home, this statement
would not coincide with the "reimbursement theory" used as a
basis of the decision. It seems unfortunate that in reaching such
a proper judgment that through no fault of the justice higher
and firmer ground was not to be reached.
Prescription
A suit to try title was before the court in Finley v. Louisiana
Central Lumber Company1 2 based on two major contentions.
132. 204 La. 1058, 16 So. (2d) 839 (1944).
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The first was that the description contained in the deed did not
sufficiently identify the property and, hence, could not serve as a
basis for the ten years acquirendi prescription. As copied into the
record, the description, being unpunctuated and practically unintelligible, therefore, could not have been translative of title.
The original deed, however, which governed, set forth a clear
description. After much quibbling about certification, et cetera,
this point was settled. The second contention was the oft found
plea that proper possession was not exercised. After review of
evidence the court applied the following settled rules:
"actual corporeal possession of a part of a tract, with title
to the whole and intention to possess the whole, constitutes
full possession as contemplated by the Code. When actual
possession is once acquired, although the act by which it was
acquired has ceased, the presumption is, unless a contrary
the intention of retaining the
intention clearly appears, 18that
3
possession acquired exists.
Chains of title are traced in Lebleu v. Hanszen,184 and a careful analysis of pertinent facts occupied the attention of the court.
No decision was found necessary on the question of which litigant had the paramount record title, as the court agreed with
the district judge that the defendants had fully established the
four conditions necessary to acquire the land ,by the acquistive
prescription of ten years-namely, good faith, a .just title, uninterrupted possession as owner and an object which may be acquired by prescription.
The major concern in M. H. Nahigian, Incorporated v. Haddad'81 was analysis of evidence offered for the purpose of proving a waiver or renunciation of prescription of certain notes
twelve years old. The materials offered were shown to bear upon
another matter than the notes, as was also the case with certain
payments alleged to have interrupted prescription.
An attempt to prove the notes as an acknowledgment in
writing of a debt and thus shift into the ten year prescription
under Harmon & Stringfellow v. Lagarde'36 also failed.
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Esparros v. Vicknair1 7 is concerned with testimony proving
the actual corporeal possession by the defendant of the property
in question to have existed for thirty years. A small segment of
land claimed by the defendant was not adjudicated as its alleged
138
title owner was not before the court.
137. 205 La. 699, 17 So. (2d) 924 (1944).
138. See also Esparros v. Vicknair, 192 La. 383, 188 So. 37 (1939).

